NEW EMIGRATION FROM CHINA: PATTERNS, CAUSES AND IMPACTS (2024)

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Dang Dai Zhongguo Yan Jiu. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2021 Aug 9.

Published in final edited form as:

Dang Dai Zhongguo Yan Jiu. 2019; 26(1): 5–31.

PMCID: PMC8351535

NIHMSID: NIHMS1042442

PMID: 34377583

QIAN SONG¹ and ZAI LIANG

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Abstract

Emigration from China has drawn increasing attention from the media and academia. In this paper, we survey the scholarly literature on emigration from China focusing on the post-1949 period. We review policy changes and patterns of emigration over time, and identify possible causes of emigration and impacts for migrant origin communities and China as a whole. To the extent relevant, we also explore how new patterns of emigration from China in the 21^st century also impact migrant destination countries. Finally, we discuss potential contributions of the Chinese case to the general area of migration studies and identify future research directions in this field.

I. POLICY CHANGES AND EMIGRATION FROM CHINA

After the establishment of People’s Republic of China in 1949, international migration from China was tightly controlled, thereby international migration was subsumed for a few decades. In tandem with the economic reforms, signified by the “open door” policy, the year 1978 witnessed a drastic relaxation of restraints on international migration on the part of Chinese government. Individuals who wanted to emigrate for family reunions, study abroad or other pursuits were routinely granted. Great outflows then transpired. Between 1979 and 1985, around 350,000 new migrants had crossed the border. The span 1985–1986 witnessed the implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens, which defined moving across borders as the right of citizens and to a certain extent decoupled emigration from general politics. The next ten years saw a soaring number of 5,600,000 outflows from China, including both temporary visitors and long-term emigrants, with at least 600,000 settled down in destination countries (Zhuang, 2000). This unprecedented “going abroad fever” (出国热) was captured by a series of novels and TV shows in the early 1980s and 1990s in China, such as the non-fiction novel “Wandering around the World Scale” 世界大串联) by Hu Ping (1988) and the TV drama “the Beijingers in New York” (北京人在纽约). These were apparently well received and stimulated heated discussions among the public on the lives of Chinese emigrants in their destination countries. Controls on Chinese going abroad were further loosened after 2002 when the requirement for a foreign invitation and approval from the local Public Security Bureau in getting a passport was abolished.

Hand in hand with the loosening of control over emigration, the orientation of the Chinese government shifted from preventing people from going abroad to encouraging return migration. A significant effort was thus devoted to stimulating investment from ethnic Chinese overseas and attracting highly skilled migrants to go back either temporarily or permanently and contribute their financial or intellectual resources to China. Government agencies at various levels, especially of the areas who have histories of sending emigrants before the 1950s strived to build connections with a set of Chinese overseas organizations through which to draw business investment and educational or other local projects. At the national level, in 2000, 2001 and 2007, a series of “Guiding Opinions” (意见) were published consecutively as a result of a joint effort of government bureaus to relax the constraints of studying overseas and enhance the effort of drawing back returnees (“Guiding Opinions” 2000, 2001, 2007). As a result, a variety of projects both at national and regional level have been set up to stimulate return migration, and cooperation with overseas academia has been intensified.

II. NEW EMIGRANTS

Emigrants who left China after the year 1978 were usually referred to as new emigrants (Bail and Shen, 2008^²; M. Li, 2001; Liu, 2005; Zhuang, 1997). Compared with their predecessors, new emigrants show a variety of different characteristics, which include: 1) coming from more diverse regions with diverse backgrounds; 2) continuing trend of polarization of professions, with concentrations in the higher and lower end of social strata; 3) tighter connections between current host society location and China; 4) circularity in their migration pattern, as transportation and communication are more accessible. These changes in composition and behaviors of new emigrants from China also have diversified the images of Chinese immigrants in the destination countries.

The magnitude of the new emigration population expands rapidly in recent decades. In 1982, a number of 56,930 have migrated out of the country, which rocketed to 234,800 in 1990 and to 756,626 in 2000 (Liang and Morooka, 2004). The 2010 Chinese census shows 1.3 million international migrants whose origins are in China.^³ This is likely to be a very large under-estimate because this census-based number only counts international migrants whose household registration status was suspended^⁴. The top three destination countries\regions for Chinese emigrants are North America, Europe and Australia. The US held 1,808,100 China-born immigrants in total, with over 900,000 obtained permanent residency since 2000; China has emerged as the second largest origin country after Mexico (CCG, 2005; DHS 2012; US Census Bureau 2010). Next, we first describe this new wave of emigrants from the perspective of the origins, discussing the changing compositional characteristics of emigrants. Then, from the perspective of the destinations, we discuss how emigrants to traditional destinations evolve with time.

1. ORIGINS

Family reunion is one of the major reasons emigrants migrate, which immediately took momentum after 1978. In areas of qiaoxiang^⁵ , such as a number of rural areas of Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang, people actively sought to migrate out the moment they were permitted to do so. Family reunion thus came into play, especially for those who had family members or relatives overseas. Over time, however, family reunion became a way through which illicit migration was induced using forged documents in those qiaoxiang, especially in Fujian and Zhejiang (M. Li, 1999; ). In Guangdong, due to its long history of emigration and large number of overseas Cantonese, family reunion, which is believed to be of the legal type, remains the foremost reason of emigration in this province since 2000 (Liang and Morooka, 2004).

Student migration is another major form of emigration from China. Between the 1950s and 1970s, there was a limited international student exchange with former Soviet Union. Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 signaled a start of scholarly exchange between China and the broader world, primarily the U.S. The first wave of scholars and students sent abroad were mostly older researchers, since young high education graduates at this time were not ready in terms of foreign language and substantive training due to the educational interruption of the Cultural Revolution in the 1950s and 1960s (Orleans, 1988). It was after 1978 that long term exchanges of scholars and students were resumed. After more liberal policies were introduced in 1985, and opportunities opened up in destination countries, “study-abroad fever” was fermented (Poston & Luo, 2007). The fever has by no means diminished in recent years, and it is further facilitated by an emerging industry of language schools and education agencies tailored for potential students studying abroad (Xiang, 2003).

Since the turn of the 21^st century, and especially after 2008, there has been a boom in the number of students and scholars going abroad, with more than a 24 percent increase each year up through 2010 (Report on Students Studying Abroad [RSSA], 2011). The same report shows that as of the end of 2010, the total number of Chinese students who had studied abroad since 1978 reached 1,570,800, with 632,200 of them returned. While North America, Europe and Australia consistently rank as top destinations for Chinese students, developed Asian countries, such as Japan and Korea also receive large number of students from China. In the US, Chinese students have become the largest group of international students (with 22 percent of the total international students in 2011), surpassing the number of students from India. In the 2015/16 academic year, Chinese students accounted for more than 31 per cent of the US international student body in the postsecondary system (328,547) ((https://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/sevis-by-the-numbers/may-2017). In Japan, about two-thirds of the on-campus foreign students in mid-2000s were Chinese (Liu-Farrer, 2009; RSSA, 2011).

Student composition is evolving well. As to sponsorship, students under government support and self-support occupy a growing percentage, while those under workplace support have declined. Between 2003 and 2010, the government-dispatched students rose from around 3,000 to 16,000 each year. This is due to new programs that the Chinese government had set up to send large number of exchange students at graduate level, with the primary condition that they would return and stay in China for at least two years (Ministry of Education of China, 2012).

Overseas students are also increasingly younger. Universities and colleges and even high schools abroad are becoming the main targets of these young students and their parents. In some major cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai, there has been an increase of 20 percent in high school students who skipped the Chinese college entrance exam and applied to colleges abroad instead (RSSA, 2011). In 2010, this group of high school students reached around 20,000. Surveys reveal that the expectation of staying in developed countries and shunning the pressure of the college entrance examination in China are the major reasons contributing to this age shifting (RSSA, 2011). These students are hardly confined to the traditional student receiving countries, such as the US, England, France, Australia and Japan; they also embrace other developing countries such as Indonesia.

The upper-middle class and the “super-rich” in China have recently become a prominent group that is actively looking into opportunities to emigrate. The scale of this emigration is expanding so rapidly that it is deemed as the “third emigration wave” after those in the late 1970s and 1990s (Center for China and Globalization [CCG], 2012). North America, Australia and New Zealand are the top destinations for this group of emigrants.

While academic studies on this group of people are still lacking, a survey conducted in 2009 revealed that among the country’s 60,000 super-rich individuals with assets of at least 100 million yuan (1US$=6.6 yuan), nearly half of them were considering emigrating overseas; and 14 percent of them were in the process or have already emigrated which rose to 27 percent in 2011 (). In 2012, approximately 13,000 Chinese emigrated through the means of investment. In 2014, of the 10, 000 investment EB-5 visa quota in the US, a total of 9,128 Chinese are recorded to have obtained this visa (US Department of State, 2015). It is estimated that a sum of 200 billion US dollars have been exported for investment in all destination countries (CCG, 2015). Since 2010, Chinese customers have also invested significantly in residential and commercial properties in the US.

Another stream of emigrants from China has also drawn international attention – the Chinese immigrants in Africa. South Africa is the largest recipient of Chinese migrants. It is estimated that there were at least 500,000 Chinese immigrants in mid-year 2011 in South Africa (Statistics South Africa, 2011). They are comprised oftwo major groups: “state-led” migrants who arrived under formal labor contracts linked to projects undertaken by large Chinese SOEs, and “independent” migrant entrepreneurs who took on various types of business ventures (Merli et al., 2016). With further investment of Chinese capital, the number of Chinese immigrants in Africa is expected to continue to increase.

2. DESTINATIONS

From the perspective of the destination countries, especially traditional destinations, such as the U.S. and Europe, illicit immigrants from China remain to be a large group of Chinese immigrants. This form of migration from China started in the early 1980s, accelerated in the 1990s, and continued at a high rate from major sending areas, namely, Fujian, Zhejiang and Northeast China. Legal and illegal migration interplay in various ways–illicit migrations are usually covered under the name of family reunions, studying abroad or other legal means of entry, which are then accompanied by overstay or working without work permit. Although emigration of this type generally favors young, risk-taking individuals, emigration of different origins follows disparate trajectories with diverse major destinations.

Amid various routes to get to the United States (over 60 different routes from China to US were identified by US investigators in the early 1990s (Skeldon, 1995)), the Fujianese immigrants mainly see New York City as the primary destination. From New York, they are disseminated to other areas of the US via ethnic employment agencies and subsequently worked in the booming Chinese takeout and buffet restaurants (). Just north of Fujian, Wenzhou and Qingtian, two areas in Zhejiang Province share a history of emigration to Europe before the establishment of the PRC and nowadays send the largest number of emigrants to Europe and a high proportion to the U.S. (M. Li, 2002; Pieke et al., 2004; Wang, 2000). The Zhejiang people are particularly known as vendors and tailors for products, such as shoes and jackets and their ambition to start new businesses whenever possible. They mostly travel across western and southern Europe in the 1980s, and countries like Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Spain, France and Portugal all have a visible presence of these migrants; after the early 1990s, Eastern Europe also witnessed their immigration and the rapid growth of their small business (Fu, 2009).

In the destination countries, students from China have also evolved over the years. They no longer just majored in the area of physical science or engineering. MBA programs, social science and humanity programs are becoming increasingly popular among such students. Taking advantage of the linguistic, cultural and social skills shared by this student-turned-employee group with majors in humanities and social sciences, multinational companies in Japan for instance managed to expand their business in China (Liu-Farrer, 2009). However, “brain waste” for highly educated Chinese migrants, who were underemployed may still be a problem, at least in the US and Canada (). It is also worth noting that besides the purpose of receiving quality education, student identity is also exploited as a means to enter developed countries where part time jobs are allowed for students. In Japan, for instance, facilitated by profit-driven language schools, many Chinese labor workers in the 1990s entered the country with student visas (Liu-Farrer, 2009).

In recent decades, with further globalization and transnationalism, the definition of return migration has become flexible, and it becomes harder to describe patterns of migration from either an origin or a destination perspective. This is especially true for the group of scholars and professionals who constantly travel back and forth. This emigration is more like a two-way street, emigrants usually travel back and forth and serve as middlemen linking scholarships and businesses between two countries. The “diaspora scientists”, for example, act as intermediaries between Chinese and non-Chinese background scientists, help overcome cultural barriers, and build relationships between institutes as well as individuals (). Realizing this new pattern of emigration, the Chinese government increasingly emphasizes “weiguo fuwu” (serve the motherland) which has blurred the limits of geography instead of “huiguo fuwu” (return and serve the motherland). Consequently, the government has guaranteed this mobility and promoted the circulation of professional elites and entrepreneurs overseas ().

III. DRIVING FORCES OF EMIGRATION

One theme that constantly emerges in the international migration in China literature is the local economic sociopolitical and cultural context in the origin communities. Economic incentive serves as a powerful force to drive young laborers out. In rural areas of Fuzhou where farming and fishing were used to be the major occupations of local people, the shortage of farmland and depletion of fish directly created the economic need to migrate out in the 1980s (Chin, 1999). The dramatic rise of migration from urban areas in the northeastern provinces (with nearly no outmigration history) is more of the outcome of economic restructuring and shifting away from state socialism in heavy industries that used to dominate the region. Massive layoffs and the smashing of “rice iron bowl” due to economic reform in the mid-1990s have liberated laborers with little professional skills (Xiang,2007).

Once emigration started, local cultural change further fueled the process. Whether built on a remembered tradition of emigration or no emigration history, the first wave of emigrants in villages were able to bring ample opportunities and modern lifestyles back to the communities which were later transformed into grandiose housing structures and other symbols. Legends in a foreign land were told in local communities (often with exaggeration) and the quick climbing up of the new rich in local social stratification further inspired more people migrating out. Even those who remain in local villages are proud to have family members abroad, and some in Fuzhou, for instance, are reported to be obsessed with living in the U.S. (Chin, 1999; M. Li, 1999). A recent study () also shows that “vicarious consumption” patterns that the left-behind family members are having is driving up the prices of land, real estate, rental housing, and the overall cost of living in Fuzhou, making those with no emigrant family members harder to make a living. And this further spurs emigration in the area.

Perhaps the most important driving force of emigration is China’s ever-deepening integration into global economy. This is manifested both in the policy-driven projects from above, as well as the forces of globalization from below. On the policy side, for instance, Chinese immigrants to Africa grows in tandem with rising Chinese investments in the African continent. Through contracts with African countries and China’s “policy banks” to offer attractive financing projects, Chinese companies expanded their business in many African countries, which brought a large number of Chinese immigrant workers (French, 2014). Needless to say, it also provides much needed investment and jobs for African workers many of whom are facing major challenges of high unemployment rates. In South Africa, one of the most successful economies in Africa, unemployment rate in 2017 is as high as 27.78% (http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=10658). We should also note that China’s renewed encounter with Africa in the 21^st century not only provides opportunities for Chinese immigrants but also has strategic importance for China’s future path of economic development as shown in the case of access to uranium in Namibia for China’s future energy source (Larmer, 2017).

Looking ahead, China’s ambitious “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI, formerly One Belt One Road), an economic and strategic agenda to tie Eurasia more closely along the overland and maritime routes, will be a powerful motor for continuing Chinese migration to a number of new destinations. Launched in 2013, BRI identified 65 participating countries across South Asia, West Asia, East Europe, and Africa, which account for 60% of the world’s population and 30% of its GDP (). At the Belt and Road Form in May, 2016, China pledged about $125 billion in financing, and annual investments of approximately $150 billion are conceived for the next decade. A great amount of attention paid to BRI is the massive infrastructure construction projects like high-speed railroads across countries and continents. Ensuing these infrastructure building and investments are the movement of people. In the short term, it is expected that the migration pattern will be similar to the pattern in Africa, where contract workers and small entrepreneurs take a large part of the migrants (Wang, 2017). Over time, other types of migration may follow. For example, as stated by the Action Plan (2015), the Chinese government provides 10,000 scholarships to the countries along the Belt and Road each year, the tourist visa process will be simplified, and joint training programs will be encouraged. Although some concerns remain in terms of carrying out the plans for countries of strong and weak governance (Dollar, 2015), there is no doubt that BRI, together with Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank will further the integration of Chinese economy with these countries and stimulate new waves of international migration among these participating countries.

On the side of globalization and emigration from below, the small/medium scale businesses that Chinese are engaging in Europe, North America and Africa are determined by the fact that there are a vast number of available inexpensive goods made in China, which are welcomed by the other countries. For the small-time businesses owners in Africa, emigration provides a way to realize their dream of attaining self-employment as shown by Lin (2014) in the case of South Africa, and Lin, Liang, and Zhu (2017) in the case of Chinese immigrants in Algeria.

Border trade is another example of such a global force. Economic communications with other countries also have created a large number of overseas job opportunities for Chinese. For the increasing number of Japanese corporations who aim for the Chinese market, Chinese graduates in Japan who are versed with both cultures and languages are actively recruited by those companies and encouraged to stay (Liu-Farrer, 2009). Labor contracts usually arise in regions where the Chinese government has major industrial projects, such as southeastern Asia and Africa, with most of the Chinese being technical staff, factory workers or employed peasants (Zhuang, 2008). Ma (2004) estimated that, by 2002, some 520,000 Chinese workers were engaged in labor contracts abroad, and a much larger number is expected in more recent years.

Global impact from the potential destination countries has also played an important role in attracting Chinese migrants. Some argue that the admiration of western lifestyles and quest for freer political environment that promoted continuing emigration from the local community is a product of political and cultural expansion from these countries (M. Li, 2005). Among the “super-rich” and upper-middle class Chinese immigrants, a better education for children, security of personal wealth and a preparation for retirement are among the top reasons of emigration. It is also suspected that the major concern for leaving China has to do with uncertain political and social trajectory in China (CCG, 2012; Johnson, 2012). The wealthy families are also seeking to send out their children in elite international education as soon as possible. It can be said that the new rich are taking emigration as a means to secure their wealth and social status, both for themselves and their children (Xiang, 2015).

As to the destinations, relative lack of labor and economic vacuum, such as the growing need of Chinese restaurants ensured the employment of the undocumented from China. Evolving policies toward undocumented immigrants in destination countries also encouraged immigration to these destinations, such as Europe and the U.S. where policies were implemented over several years to legalize the undocumented (M. Li, 1999). Policies decriminalized and justified the clandestine emigration within the sending communities, and sometimes these behaviors were then considered heroic, a pathway to success, and an experience worthy of showing off (M. Li, 2001). Since the 1990s, immigration countries such as Australia and Canada have implemented or refined their migration schemes, and high-skilled immigrants are able to capitalize their human capital in their points-based system (Ho, 2015). The H1-B visa serves as a pathway for the US university graduates to obtain permanent residency of the US. Policies targeting immigrants from China also sometime provide legitimate paths. Immediately after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, the U.S. and a number of European countries created shortcut avenues to get permanent resident status. Undocumented immigrants were also seen using claims of being victims of one-child policy or of religious prosecution in the 1990s and early 2000s to gain legal status in destination countries (M. Li, 2001; Liang, 2001b).

The role of networks in initiating and sustaining the trend of international migration has been extensively discussed in the context of China, especially in Fujian where illicit migration remains important but declining. Networks usually take forms of kin networks, intermediary agencies and networks in the destinations. In communities with histories of migration, after the policy relaxation, kin networks are usually fully exploited before the use of commercial migration brokerages (usually called snakeheads) widely expands. Intermediary agencies such as smuggling organizations or snakeheads are increasingly becoming important in facilitating emigration through intensive transnational networks and highly sophisticated techniques (Liu, 2005).

Case studies on Chinese entrepreneurs in African countries, for instance, demonstrate a combination of all these forces. For example, a case study shows that a Fuqing-origin Chinese entrepreneur was able to establish an aluminum company in Algeria and made money was because he was able to utilize highly skilled Chinese labor, the inexpensive low-skilled labor and resources in Algeria, as well as capitalizing on the moral-based enforceable trust in this Qiaoxiang (). It should be noted, though, for small businesses in some destinations, such as the US and Africa, due to diversification of migration origins and factors associated with the destinations, social relations among the Chinese immigrants are less depended on shared place of origin, but more on social and economic institutions or shared economic imperative (Liang and Zhou, forthcoming; Merli et al. 2016). Theoretically, this new pattern is important as it speaks to the limit of ethnic solidarity among immigrant groups.

IV. IMPACT OF EMIGRATION

1. IMPACT ON QIAOXIANG AND BEYOND

In qiaoxiang, considerable community development was observed. Remittances sent from emigrants have raised living standards of family members who remained in China – for instance, it is estimated that the Fuzhou area received more than 200 million dollars per year from the US, and the majority of it was used for supporting families and building housings for the general Fujian area (; ; Zhu, 2001). Direct investment is also on the rise. In Mingxi, for example, 54.9 million yuan were invested in businesses like agricultural development, urban construction and tourism (M. Li et al., 2003). Local infrastructure construction, charitable works and education are also supported. These, in turn, have created ripple effect on other entrepreneurial activities (). With more locals migrating out and bringing perspectives and values back home, the remaining villagers were able to broaden their personal horizon and even modify their esthetic values, such as an increasing preference for western style housings and home decorations in these emigrant communities (M. Li et al., 2003).

While most of studies on migration and development tend to focus on economic changes in migrant-sending communities, recent work by Song and Liang (2016) moved into a new direction by looking at potential impact beyond immigrant-sending communities. They found that families with emigrants are more likely to invest in other provinces within China, and when they do, they tend to venture to further distances and receive more profits, which suggests creating more job opportunities in their domestic destinations. This research provides a way in which emigrants from Qiaoxiang are making contributions to regions outside their hometowns.

At a broader level, China as a whole have benefited from overseas Chinese by direct investment. In these areas, government agencies at various levels strived to build connections with a set of Chinese overseas organizations through which to draw business investment and educational or other local projects. Starting in the 1980s, “Chinese multinationals” run by overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia started to drive the economy of provinces such as Fujian and Zhejiang (Wang, 1993). In the 1990s, some 80% of China’s direct foreign investment is estimated to have come from overseas Chinese sources (Skeldon, 1995). Voluntary associations (shetuan) formed by these groups of overseas Chinese along the line of communal hometowns have further built the links between political leaders both in China and their residing nations (Liu, 1998).

2. IMPACTS OF THE HIGH-TALENT RETURNEES

National and local governments are developing various projects to attract high-talent emigrants to return. As early as the 1990s, some major cities in China, such as Shanghai, Beijing and Shenzhen, started to compete for returning Chinese professionals and students by creating “venture parks” and introducing preferential policies such as reduced tax rates, special loans and subsidies. Subsequently, other cities like Suzhou and Jinan followed suit. Higher education undertook parallel efforts, recognizing that achieving the goal of creating world-class universities would require scholars with PhDs from elite universities abroad. Thus, a series of programs were put forth by China’s Ministry of Education with additional private support. Such programs include “Scientific Research Foundation for the Returned Overseas Chinese Scholars” (留学回国人员科研启动基金) since 1990, “Chunhui Program” (春晖计划) in 1996, “Hundred Talents Program” (百人计划) since 1994, the ongoing “the Cheung Kong Scholar Program” (长江学者计划 since 1998, and “The Recruitment Program of Global Experts” (or Thousand Talents Program, 千人计划) since 2008, just to name a few. Those programs along with other regional plans for returnees help create favorable research environments as well as improved living environments, such as skipping salary grades, free of choice hukou locations, special pensions and awards, settlement for spouse and children etc. (See Xiang (2005) for a detailed description of governmental programs in this regard.).

These programs took effect immediately after their initiation. Between 1978 and 2009, there were a total of 1,620,700 students and scholars who went outbound to study, and less than one third of them had returned (497,400) (Qiu, 2011). However, in 2000, there were 9,100 returnees, three years later this number doubled, and in 2006 it doubled again (Bail and Shen, 2008). China is increasingly benefitted from the return of these people. As early as the 1980s, upon returning, scholars often assumed more important research and/or administrative positions (Orleans, 1988). They have been the carriers of cultural and technical “know-how” and have increased the understanding and both formal and informal lines of communications between China and other countries (Orleans, 1988).

In the realm of science and technology, in particular, returnees are playing a leading role. One major portal on the Chinese net – Sohu.com was established by Zhang, Chaoyang, a returnee who came back in 1997 with Ph.D. from MIT; the largest searching engine in China Baidu.com was set up by Robin Li who returned the same year from Silicon Valley. The two figures are just two emblems of the multiple engineer-entrepreneurs with international education background. Research institutions and universities have accepted high proportion of returnees as well. It was reported that 54 percent of engineering schools research fellows and 77 percent of University Rectors of Ministry of Education are returnees who have made essential contributions in engineering, superconductor technologies or gene mapping (Bail and Shen, 2008). According to a sample of members of the Thousand Talents Program, Zweig and Wang (2013) found that these returnees are very talented, mature group of researchers and entrepreneurs, with the average age of 50, and the majority (83.7%) working in innovative jobs either in universities, research institutions or companies. Some foreigners and top academics have also been recruited by this program, such as Robert Gleen Parker, a former University of Michigan professor who now works at Shanghai Jiaotong University, and Ross Macallister, who previously worked as a partner at Atos Consulting in UK, is now the Chief Information Officer of Sinopec.

These returnees have brought in foreign capital and have brought foreign visitors to China (Zweig, 2004). A number of returnees of scholars and professionals are transnational in nature, with affiliations in both China and the U.S. and traveling back and forth, creating a conducive environment for scientific collaborations between scientists and scholars in both countries (Xiang, 2005; Zweig et al. 2008). In particular, people with administrative posts in the university or heads of departments are more likely to interact with China, which helps the Chinese scholars to move research into new arenas (Zweig et al. 2008).

Some concerns have been raised regarding these returnees as well. From the 1990s to 2009, the (overseas) retention rate for China-born Ph.D. recipients in the fields of science and engineering remained the highest among all nationalities 15 years after graduation (Finn, 2012). This suggests a brain drain. Some expressed concerns that few returnees are from first-tier universities or doing first-rate work (Zweig et al., 2006; Zweig and Wang, 2013). Some works show that professionals still have concerns about the complex guanxi they have to deal with after they return and to what degree meritocracy would be rewarded in universities and research institutions (Zweig et al. 2008; Zweig and Wang, 2013). Other common reasons cited are relatively low salaries, problems with contract posts, children’s education and spouses’ jobs, or possible family separations. By contrast, in the political sphere, many such trainees have short stays abroad, and a low percentage of formal degree qualification from the overseas universities with most of them concentrated in technocratic posts (Bail & Shen, 2008; Zweig, 2004).

Nevertheless, the trend is clear that the former brain drain is reversing at a faster rate. Some argue that China is actually experiencing a brain gain, and some argue that brain circulation might be a better description in contemporary China and the future (Skeldon, 2009). Li et al. (2015) coined the term “intellectual migration” to describe how brain circulation between countries such as China and the US takes on complicated forms and brings economic and geopolitical changes to home countries like China. Undoubtedly, this brain circulation will bring about deep influences on various aspects of the Chinese society.

Recently, the return of young fresh graduates has drawn increasing attention. According to a survey conducted by CCG in 2017, these returnees are facing intensified pressure on the domestic job market. Up to the end of 2016, an overall of 2,651,100 have returned from overseas, with 432,500 of them returned on 2016. Among these fresh graduates, high talent returnees are a very small proportion of them. Only 3.5% of them obtained a Ph.D degree. 47.3% studied business or finance, while 16.2% and 7.4% obtained applied science and natural science degrees. Sales, technical positions, marketing, public relations and advertising are the top positions for this group of returnees. Although concerns have been raised for this group of returnees regarding their job mismatch and low success rates in starting up new businesses, they are advantageous over others in terms of their skills in international outlooks, foreign language capacity, and transcultural communication. Their major destination cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Guangzhou, and Wuhan, are expected to benefit the most from these returnees (CCG, 2017).

What it means for China facing the magnitude of emigration among the super-rich, in terms of business opportunities, public impacts among many other fields, still remains to be seen. However, from the perspective of the Chinese government, due to the large amount of wealth transfer from China to the US and Canada, it may concern the possibility of money-laundry, capital drain, felony escape, and the threat of weakening foreign exchange controls (CCG, 2015).

V. IMPACT ON THE HOST SOCIETIES

Some of the immediate consequences of the migration of the super-rich Chinese concerns real estate and jobs created in the destinations. To the extent that investment, such as purchasing real estate properties, helps gain access to residency, citizenship or the first step getting into the desired destinations, Chinese immigrants are driving real estate booms in places such as Midtown Manhattan and selected places in Europe (CMBBC, 2011; Johnson, 2012). These investments supported both local construction jobs and indirect service jobs associated with these construction workers. Increased Chinese travelers and immigrants also help the expansion of both low-skilled and high-skilled Chinese immigrants. Chinese shoppers and tourists are creating new immigrant labor market niches in the US. More job opportunities are created for salespeople who speak Mandarin Chinese, and more Chinese immigrants are taking on jobs such as tour bus drivers or tour guides (Liang and Zhou, forthcoming). Chinese immigrants with proficient English and a familiarity of both Chinese and US cultures have also pursued jobs that became available by Chinese investors in the US.

The settlement of new Chinese immigrants has far expanded the geographical area of Chinatowns as well. Recent decades have witnessed a spatial diffusion of businesses in the US owned by Chinese immigrants. Chinese restaurants, nail salons, and massage or tuina places are some of the major businesses owned by low-skilled Chinese immigrants (Liang and Zhou, 2018). These businesses mostly serve non-Chinese customers, creating opportunities for intergroup contacts, diffusion of Chinese culture, and raising interesting questions about acculturation and assimilation.

Current large outflow of students that involves such a wide selection of destinations is unprecedented in Chinese history, which generates enormous impacts for China and the world. Such influences include the exceptionally large sum of tuitions that flow into those destination countries, as well as other economic and cultural connections built by those students after they graduate and return or turn to transnational in various ways.

As stated in the BRI’s Action Plan (2015), one of the five goals of the BRI is to strengthen people-to-people bond, which involves extensive cultural and academic exchanges, personnel exchanges and cooperation. With the deepening of BRI and intensified movement of people among participating countries, we may expect that an emerging number of countries and places will be exposed to Chinese culture. Importantly, as China deepens its engagement with the world, all the emigrants, together with return migrants, will contribute to a new perception of China presented to the world, one that China is becoming a key player in the international stage. This envision is also emphasized by President Xi Jinping in the term “the common destiny of mankind” in his report delivered to the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October, 2017.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

This is the best of times for emigration studies in China as international migration is on the rise, providing an unparalleled opportunity to study migration on such a big scale. Migration in China is important because of the size and rapid growth of migrant population, and potential implications for the world. As many China observers watch the Chinese economy became the second largest economy in the world, we see how the development of Chinese economy and its engagement with the world economy have an impact on emigration and on other parts of the world. In this paper, we synthesize recent literature on emigration from China. In the concluding section of this paper, we highlight some findings that emerge from recent studies on emigration from China and identify some areas of research that we believe hold high priority in the future.

First and fundamentally, China’s migration story addresses the classic migration question of migration and development. China’s recent economic development is clearly a catalyst for emigration. China’s transition to a market economy dictates that both capital and labor have to be mobile. Economic opportunities ultimately generate demand for workers and labor force must be mobile to take these opportunities abroad. Compared to other major emigrants-sending countries such as Mexico, emigration process in China attracts individuals at different levels: low skill level and highly skilled level as well. This is clearly exhibited in international migration as highly educated and not so highly educated individuals find their way to other countries.

Because the relationship between migration and development is a reciprocal relationship, the Chinese case demonstrates abundantly clear that China’s economic development is related to its migration story. In fact, the setup of China’s special economic zones in early 1980s and the flowing of large amount of investment from overseas Chinese are other demonstrations of this connection. If the earlier story of success shows the power of capital, the more recent story illustrates the power of knowledge as many western educated Chinese scholars and engineers contribute to China’s development in science and technology, higher educational institutions, and diffusion of innovative ideas. The modern technology of communication and transportation only makes this process take place in much easier and more creative ways than earlier migration researchers had imagined. China presents a unique opportunity for students of migration and development because unlike other developing countries that are experiencing emigration, China has spent billions of dollars upgrading infrastructure such as highways and high speed railroads, which are solid foundations for attracting new business investment.

With the rise of China and globalization, the well-being of Chinese immigrants across the globe is expected to improve as well. More job opportunities will be created for both low-skilled and high-skilled immigrant workers. China has just replaced the US for sending out the largest number of international travelers. Chinese immigrants in New York City are taking on jobs such as tour bus drivers and tour guides. The growing Chinese economy with consumers with ever stronger purchasing power has also attracted companies from other countries to tap into the Chinese market. Professionals who are familiar with both Chinese and the destination culture, and proficient in the destination language are taking advantage of the opportunities to work as intermediaries or job opportunities offered in these companies in the destinations (Liang & Zhou, forthcoming; Liu-Farrer, 2009).

Second, the Chinese case also presents some challenges for migration theories. As we show in this paper, some of the migration theories work very well in the context of China, such as migration networks, economic development and migration, human capital theory of migration, and theory of migration selectivity. However, the story of Chinese immigrants in Africa also serves as a case for emigration from relatively developed countries to less developed countries. The two major Chinese immigrant groups in Africa demonstrated that 1) capital investment led by the state can assume a significant role to stimulate emigration; 2) individuals can take advantage of the benefits of globalization to realize their entrepreneurial ambitions in a different country. State-led emigration will play an increasingly prominent role in the future, especially as the “Belt and Road Initiative” (or, “One Belt One Road Initiative”) gradually unfolds, which starts to impact a larger part of the world in substantially new ways.

In conclusion, we want to identify some areas of migration research that are promised to be important in the years to come in the context of China. One topic that deserves more attention is the group of highly educated and highly achieved individuals. There are two stories embedded in this topic. The first story is how this group of highly educated Chinese immigrants contributes to China’s economic development and perhaps benefits from it in that process. This is a difficult topic to study as systematic data collection of highly educated immigrants requires a high level of coordination and perhaps even different methodology. The second story derives from recently highly publicized reports of emigration of upper class or wealthy Chinese. This is another story that is somewhat at variance with what conventional migration theory would predict; typically, upper class people do not emigrate. What are the individual and structural reasons on the side of both China and destinations that motivate them to leave? How would “purchasing citizenship” inform current migration theories? Liu-Farrer (2016) recently introduced a new perspective to study this group of emigrants: emigration as a class-based consumption. As these emigrants are avid and smart investors, this class-based consumption may bring financial returns over the long term for themselves and their children. In addition, we suspect this group of emigrants are also more likely to be more transnational and they tend to be on the go all the time. This makes a systematic study of this group of new immigrants more challenging. Clearly, migration researchers need to go beyond newspaper headlines to examine the driving forces behind this recent trend of emigration from China.

Another promising area of research is the promotion of a comparative approach of migration studies, as international migration becomes more and more a practical option for an increasingly large segment of the population in China. The comparative approach means that we study the process of international migration to different locations such as the U.S. and Europe (as in the case of Lu et al. (2013)). China has some unique characteristics that many other countries do not have. For example, China shares borders with many countries and sends international migrants to nearly all parts of the world. A comparative study of the migration and adaptation process of Chinese immigrants in these countries would no doubt make a major contribution to the migration field in the 21^st century. China’s One Belt One Road Initiate will involve nearly 70 countries and has a big infrastructure component (Huang, 2017). Here too, it holds enormous potential for students of migration to explore emigration from China and international migration from these involved countries to China (Wang, 2016).

Finally, as China becomes the second largest economy in the world, it also is becoming a country of destination for international migrants. The most prominent example is the case of African merchants in Guangzhou. This is a classic example to illustrate that investment in a country builds more human connections, and international migration will follow (Massey et al., 1994; Sassen, 1990). Of course, there are now many more countries that send international migrants (short-term or long-term) to China. The good news is that the Chinese government already has taken initial steps as reflected in the inclusion of information on foreigners in China in the 2010 Chinese population census. We are still at the early stage of this research enterprise. That also means that this is a gold mine that we believe is waiting for many migration researchers to explore in the years to come.

Footnotes

²Bail and Shen (2008) narrowed this term to cover only skilled migrants who left China after 1978.

³Data for this are kindly provided by China National Bureau of Statistics (March 2013).

⁴Based on similar definition of emigration in these censuses, these numbers show the extent to which emigration had increased over the past three decades. World Bank (2011) provides an estimate of 8.3 million for the stocks of emigrants from China, which should be closer to the volume of emigrants from China over an extended period.

⁵The ancestral hometowns of overseas Chinese since the 19th century. These communities are typically more developed, given the abundant resources coming in form of remittances.

Contributor Information

QIAN SONG, THE RAND CORPORATION.

ZAI LIANG, UNIVERSITY AT ALBANY, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK.

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